Intrusion handling in wireless mesh networks (WMNs) is a relatively less addressed topic. The difficulty may lie in the fact that there are other wireless networks for which some intrusion detection or prevention schemes are proposed that could also be applied in some way in a WMN setting. As those schemes are contributing, researchers may not find it necessary to specifically focus on this field. Another critical reason may be the difficulty in developing an effective scheme for WMNs. In fact, the structural differences among various wireless ad hoc networking technologies make it imperative to devise the mechanisms in subtle but critically different ways. For WMNs, there is a proper network backbone that is called mesh backbone (which is not present in many other wireless network counterparts), which supports the fringe part or the mesh clients. Hence, it is often possible to install the intrusion handling mechanisms or agents in the stable part and allowing some flexibility in the client or fringe parts. Nonetheless, instead of thinking in this pattern, we take a different approach of tackling intrusion by allowing an intruder to stay in the network as long as it proves to be worthy of staying in the network by supporting the network's regular activities. The idea is that by not always directly purging rogue entities, one could exploit the intruder's resources, thereby benefiting the network. We call our approach an intrusion-tackling mechanism and term it a Pay-and-Stay model. Alongside presenting the details and analysis of our model, in this paper, we also present the basics of various forms of intrusion handling in such types of networks. Using our evaluation results, we found that the model could be very effective in handling intruders and defending the network against a broad range of security attacks.
Introduction
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs), using IEEE 802.11s or IEEE 802.16j allow the multi-hop Internet access to extend the network service coverage without connecting each access point to the wired network. 1, 2 This technology could significantly reduce the investment and maintenance cost of wireless connectivity to cities, municipalities, and other end-users, because of which the WMN has become a very popular topic of research in the recent years. However, popularity cannot conceal the inherent weakness that it has as a wireless network. Like any other wireless network, the secure authentication with access control and various security issues still remain in this field as a paramount issue to ensure proper service to the legitimate users, while preventing a variety of attacks. Most of the security threats are posed by the illegitimate entities that enter or intrude within the network perimeter, which could be commonly termed as intruders. Sometimes a legitimate node could also be compromised in some way so that an attackerintended task for 'security breach' could be performed. We, in this paper, term any such kind of rogue node or entity as an intruder. So, the main objective of this work is to identify any kind of intrusion in a WMN and handle it in a sophisticated manner so that a wide range of security attacks can be deterred, as well as the network being benefited. As we go along through the paper, we will explain the concepts and motivations behind our approach.
Mesh architecture and related background
The mesh architecture of a wireless network concentrates on the emerging market requirements for building networks that are highly scalable and cost effective. However, WMNs lack efficient security guarantees in various protocol layers. 3, 4 There are a number of factors that come into consideration. Firstly, all communications go through the shared wireless nodes in WMNs, which make the physical security vulnerable. Secondly, the mesh nodes are often mobile, which move to different directions and often change the topology of the network. Finally, since all communications are transmitted via wireless nodes, any malicious node can provide updates with the misleading topology information and those updates could spread out over the whole network topology. 5, 6 All these points make it difficult to ensure a proper level of security. However, it is intended to achieve at least some kind of agreed-upon standard for a particular application scenario by identifying the rogue entities within the network. That is why we believe that detecting the rogue node (intruder, thus an intrusion event) and handling the intruder deftly can keep away different kinds of attacks and keep the network healthy for its proper operations.
The basic concept behind our approach
WMNs consist of mesh routers and mesh clients, where mesh routers form the backbone of the network that provides network access to both the mesh and conventional clients. Mesh clients can either connect (see Figure 1 ) to a backbone or among each other. Hence, the mesh client can access the network through the mesh router in a multi-hop fashion. Therefore, any malicious node or intruder can attack the network in the forms of a blackhole attack, grayhole attack, Sybil attack, and so on. 1, 5 In all of these attacks, the routing packets are deliberately misled toward wrong destinations or network entities. Once the malicious node (here, we will call it an intruder) has control over the packet after getting it in its trap, the packet could be modified, fabricated, dropped, or forwarded (arbitrarily), all of which are considered major obstacles for secure and guaranteed routing in a WMN. Our idea is that in such an attack scenario, we will allow the node to operate, but for its actions it needs to pay at a high value so that it is deterred from doing further mischief. We call our approach the 'Pay-and-Stay' model of intruder tackling, as the intruder needs to pay for its stay once it sets itself within the network. We will illustrate how we achieve our goal in the later sections. It should be noted here that we focus on the modeling of intruder/intrusion detection and its efficient tackling; other issues, such as physical layer issues, transmission and channel or signal-related issues, core routing issues, cryptographic and key management issues, etc., are out of the scope of this work.
Structure of this paper
Following the introduction in Section 1, in Section 2 we state the basic information and preliminaries of general intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and intrusion prevention systems (IPSs). In this section, we discuss the methods used in such systems and also clarify the difference between IPSs and IDSs. This knowledge will be needed later to understand how we treat the matter from our angle. Then, in Section 3, our motivation and related works are mentioned. Section 4 presents the Pay-and-Stay model of intrusion handling in WMNs. Our analysis and discussion are put in Section 5. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 6 by outlining the achievements and future research directions.
Intrusion detection and prevention basics and relevance to wireless mesh networks
Intrusion detection is defined as the process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and networking resources. Generally, the security mechanisms implemented to identify intrusions can be broadly summarized into the following.
(a) IDSs, which are hardware and/or software mechanisms that detect and log inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activities and report these for further investigations. Hence, an IDS is an essential component of defensive measures protecting computer systems and networks against harm and abuse. 7 The main aim of the IDS is to detect security attacks and to provide a proper response. 8 So, in a single sentence, an IDS is defined as the technique that is used to detect and respond to intrusion activities from a malicious host or network. 9 There are mainly two categories of IDSs: (i) host-based IDSs and (ii) networkbased IDSs. The agents for both are installed either in a single host or in various network components. The term 'agent' is typically used for IDPS (intrusion detection and prevention system) technologies that monitor only a single host. 10,11 (b) IPSs, which contain IDS functionalities but more sophisticated systems that are capable of taking immediate action in order to prevent or reduce the malicious behavior.
An IDS tool, in a general sense, is capable of distinguishing between insider attacks originating from inside the network (coming from own network devices) and external ones (attacks and the threats posed by outsiders who entered the network). 12 Once an intrusion has been detected, a typical IDS agent issues alerts notifying the administrators of this fact. The next step is undertaken either by the administrators or the IDS agent itself, by taking advantage of additional countermeasures (specific block functions to terminate sessions, backup systems, routing connections to a system trap, legal infrastructure, etc.) -following the network's security policy. An IDS is an element of the total security policy. Among various IDS tasks, intruder identification is one of the fundamental ones.
Host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) -this type of IDS involves software or agent components, which are run on the server, router, switch, or network appliance (that is for a WMN, in any of the network devices). However, the agent versions must report to a console or can be run together on the same host, as depicted in Figure 2 . Basically, the HIDS provides poor real-time response and cannot effectively defend against one-time catastrophic events. In fact, HIDSs are much better at detecting and responding to long-term attacks, such as data thieving. 13 Network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) -this type of IDS captures network traffic packets, such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and Internetwork Packet Exchange/ Sequenced Packet Exchange (IPX/SPX), and analyzes the contents against a set of RULES or SIGNATURES to determine if a POSSIBLE event has taken place. False positives are common when an IDS system is not configured or 'tuned' to the environment traffic it is trying to analyze. 10 The main task of an IDS is defending a computer system or network by detecting an attack and possibly repealing it. Detecting hostile attacks depends on the number and type of appropriate actions. Intrusion prevention requires a well-selected combination of 'baiting and trapping' aimed at both investigations of threats. Diverting the intruder's attention from protected resources is another task. Both the real system and a possible trap system are constantly monitored. Data generated by IDSs is carefully examined (this is the main task of each IDS) for detection of possible attacks (intrusions). The functionalities of a typical network IDS 11 could be noted as:
-monitoring and analyzing both a node and the network or system; -analyzing network configuration and vulnerabilities; -assessing network and data integrity; -ability to recognize patterns typical to attacks; -tracking the network policy violations; -analysis of abnormal activities.
In order to detect the intruders, the following techniques are usually implemented in either HIDSs or NIDSs. 9,14
Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection (AD) was introduced in the late 1980s with the intrusion detection expert system (IDES). 15 Anomaly detectors identify abnormal or unusual behavior (anomalies) on a host or network. They function based on the assumption that attacks are different from 'normal' (legitimate) activities and can therefore be detected by systems that identify these differences. Anomaly detectors construct profiles representing normal behavior of users, hosts, or network connections. These profiles are constructed from historical data collected over a period of normal operation. The detectors then collect event data and use a variety of measures to determine when monitored activity deviates from the norm (or standard). There are many measures and techniques that are used in AD, including threshold detection, statistical measures, rulebased measures, and other measures, including neural networks, genetic algorithms, and immune system models. 14 
Signature detection
Misuse detectors analyze system activity, looking for events or sets of events that match a predefined pattern of events that describe a known attack. As the patterns corresponding to known attacks are called signatures, misuse detection is sometimes called 'signature-based detection'. The most common form of misuse detection used in commercial products specifies each pattern of events corresponding to an attack as a separate signature. However, there are more sophisticated approaches to doing misuse detection (called 'state-based' analysis techniques) that can leverage a single signature to detect groups of attacks. 14 Misuse detection techniques, in general, are not effective against the latest kinds of attacks that have no matched rules or patterns yet.
IDSs and IPSs for wireless mesh networks
Both fields of IDSs and IPSs are insufficiently researched in the case of WMNs. As this type of network has a mesh backbone, which could have devices with a proper amount of resources and considerably high energy supply, the usual intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms (what we have discussed so far in the previous sections) could be often applied on the basic structure/backbone. However, the problem arises when we want to deal with intrusions at the end-user level (mesh clients or fringe portion). Figure 1 shows a typical structure of a hybrid WMN, where we show the fringes of the entire network.
The fringe parts (i.e., mesh clients) could consist of different types of devices ranging from a laptop to a mobile phone, and even a wireless sensor network (WSN) could be at the mesh network-end as mesh clients. Any effective intrusion handling mechanism for a WSN could be difficult to implement on the sensors because of their lack of proper resources, and this matter is treated as a separate research issue, which is out of the scope of this work. However, for other types of fringe sections as shown in Figure 1 , some kind of intrusion handling mechanism can be employed. Our work mainly focuses on this area, where a different approach of dealing with an intrusion could be beneficial for the network by allowing an intruder to stay in the network rather than instantly purging it out once it is caught. This matter will be discussed further in Section 4. However, before that in the next section, we will investigate this scantily done research issue alongside other related works that motivated us to think in the way we modeled our mechanisms.
Related works and motivation
As noted before, there are only a few notable works on intrusion handling in WMNs. In this section, we mention these works, published in recent years, alongside other relevant works influencing our work.
RADAR is a reputation-based scheme for detecting anomalous nodes in WMNs presented by Zhang et al. 16 The authors use the concept of reputation to characterize and quantify the mesh node's behavior and status in terms of some performance metrics. The RADAR architecture shows how the reputation of network nodes is maintained. The reputation management is defined as a feedback process that involves the monitoring and tracking of a mesh node's performance and the evaluation reports from the witnesses. A trust network construction algorithm is also presented and performance is measured taking some critical parameters, such as false positive, decision accuracy, response latency, and detection overhead, into account.
The idea of using reputation is not very different to the ideas used in the available literatures in other fields, but the way the authors formed their algorithm and architecture for the WMN is proven to be effective for some scenarios.
Li et al. 17 describe an architecture of asymmetric distributed and cooperative IDSs for WMNs. In this work, the authors mention the notion of selfish behavior of the suspected intruder. They use a double-mode mechanism in the detection model for judgment of troubling behavior: (a) the frequency of a node's seizing channel behavior during the active time of the node; (b) the continuous sampling result of a node's back-off value. Alongside presenting the idea in mathematical form, the authors put an analysis of the whole scheme in terms of throughput ratio and detection delay.
The idea of Makaroff et al. 18 is to note down various basic information about intrusion detection in WMNs and to propose an IDS architecture. This work, however, is very elementary and the authors also note that they put forward an initial design of a modular architecture for intrusion detection, highlighting how it addresses their identified challenges. Wang et al. 19 present an IDS software prototype over a WMN test-bed. The authors implement the idea and the evaluations are presented in a limited range. This work is, however, incomplete, as there are lots of unanswered questions such as what to do with a distributed or large-scale WMN, what to do to ensure realtime analysis and detection of anomalous nodes, etc.
OpenLIDS is a lightweight IDS for WMNs presented by Hugelshofer et al. 20 This work shows an analysis of a typical wireless mesh networking device performing common intrusion detection tasks. The authors examine the participating nodes' ability to perform intrusion detection. The experimental study shows that commonly used deep packet inspection approaches are unreliable on typical hardware. So, the authors implement a set of lightweight AD mechanisms as part of an IDS, called OpenLIDS. They also show that even with the limited hardware resources of a mesh device, it can detect current malware behavior in an efficient way.
Yang et al. 21 present a very simple model of intrusion detection in WMNs. This work is questionable, as the contribution is limited to a vague work-flow diagram with insufficiently performed analysis. However, from the objective mentioned in the work, it is understood that the authors targeted designing only a framework without going into any details of the operations. Wang et al. 22 present an idea of using a finite state machine to model intrusion detection in WMNs. Using simulation studies, the authors show that under flooding-combined attack, the IDS shows a high false alarm rate due to the side-effect of flooding on the attacker's neighbors. Hence, the dummy node used in this approach needs more design features to record more information about the monitored node. This work is flawed and a convincing result is yet to be achieved.
Khan et al. 23 present a framework for intrusion detection in IEEE 802.11 WMNs. Some intrusion detection agent structures are shown. The concept is shown mainly in the forms of some diagrams and flow-charts where different components work in a cooperative fashion. The idea, however, looks not very well-baked and somewhat naive. The work presents the primary components (or agents) that should be installed in mesh routers and mesh nodes. Detection of intrusion could be made and an action database could be used for making decisions about any detected intruder. No detailed analysis is presented in the work and it basically addresses the problem superficially.
As evident from the above-mentioned works on IDS and IPS strategies in WMNs, very few countable papers have been published so far in this area. Again, none of the above works talked about utilizing the intruder for the network's benefit before purging it. Hence, we have come up with the idea of intruder/intrusion tackling using the Payand-Stay model. While Section 4 outlines the details of the model, here are shown more related works that inspired or influenced our way of thinking to build up the basic mathematical and theoretical intrusion-tackling model. Shila and Anjali 3 propose an algorithm to specifically defend against security attacks in WMNs, where the algorithm makes use of a counter threshold to find the threshold value. This threshold value will be compared with the actual number of data packets delivered. If the actual data packet is less than the threshold value, then the route is declared to contain malicious node(s), which implies the packet loss is always due to the malicious node(s). Therefore, the path will be excluded from route selection. However, the packet loss may occur due to other factors, such as mobility and battery power. If we keep excluding the route by assuming that the poor performance routes contain malicious nodes, then we may end up with few routes or no routes for communications at the end. This method may work on specific settings but is not efficient to encounter security attacks in dynamic topologies of WMNs.
Cheikhrouhou et al. 24 advocate using PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access) to authenticate the wireless clients. The PANA model also provides the cryptographic materials necessary to create an encrypted tunnel with the associated remote access router. However, the authentication procedure presented in the paper is tedious and resource-consuming. Although the framework talks about protection of the confidentiality of exchanged information and the overall approach is analyzed, it has not been tested in a detailed manner that could convince the readers about the efficiency of the approach in practical implementation cases.
Shila and Anjali 25 propose a framework of noncooperative zero-sum games between genuine and malicious mesh routers and use mathematical tools and models for their approach. This game model solves the problem of grayhole attack where the malicious node drops a subset of packets that it receives. The game has a source node as the target and a malicious node as the attacker; they compete with each other for limited resources and each node gains depending on the strategy of itself and that of the other. The attacker gains benefit from dropping packets and the target gains from forwarding packets successfully. Our approach adopts a similar game theoretic model as a part of the total solution. However, the difference is that we circumvent the flaws of this paper's idea by using our own mathematical model and choosing appropriate parameter values. As an example, Shila and Anjali take 50% of the packet arrival rate to 'send buffer', based on which the gains of both nodes vary. Therefore, it may be impractical because in reality a higher packet arrival rate is expected to minimize packet delay, and a large number of nodes should be involved in communications in any WMN.
A novel algorithm named Channel-aware Detection (CAD) has been adopted in the work presented by Shila et al. 26 The authors in this paper use two different strategies to detect the grayhole attacks. Their approach detects a potential victim mesh node (i.e., which can be attacked) by hop-by-hop loss observation and traffic overhearing. A comparative performance analysis has been shown to detect and isolate the selective forwarding attackers in the multi-hop network scenario. The probability of miss detection or false alarm is analyzed and a design is proposed to limit these to a certain threshold. However, the approach is complicated, focuses on a narrow set of attacks, and is applicable only in some restrictive scenarios. This work basically focuses on the communication and signaling aspects in the physical layer, but it is related to our work in the sense that some of the ideological concepts helped us in the formulation of our approach.
Several attentions have been devoted to investigate the use of cryptographic techniques to secure the information transmitted through the wireless network. Some other preliminary solutions have been addressed in ad hoc, sensor and WMNs to prevent different types of malicious attacks. [27] [28] [29] After presenting all the relevant works, in the next section we present our proposed model.
Our proposed approach
It should be noted before further details that our security model is for efficient intrusion handling, which we call intrusion tackling, instead of traditional or mere intrusion detection or intrusion prevention in WMNs. By this it is meant that once the basic intrusion is detected or suspicious activities are found (by the IDS or IPS), the tackling mechanism tackles the case. It also includes an intruder marking mechanism that helps in taking the final decision, once a suspected node (or intruder) is marked as an actual threat to the network. The background knowledge noted so far could be useful while explaining our approach of dealing with the issue.
The core concept of our approach is that it is not always the case that all the intruders in a network are harmful for the network. In fact, there are sometimes ways to get benefit out of the intruders or utilize them for the network's welfare or for its own benefit. Keeping this in mind, we take a different approach to tackle an intrusion. There follows an explanation of the assumptions before we proceed further.
Network and security assumptions
We assume a hybrid WMN where different types of devices could form the fringe part or could play the roles of mesh clients. A network model is shown in Figure 1 .
As it is understood from the figure, any node in the fringe parts could come and go, that is, it may be mobile, which allows a newcomer or even an intruder to try its luck in the network. As mentioned before, if a node among the legitimate mesh clients behaves suspiciously (e.g., due to compromise or malfunction), we consider it as an intruder afterwards. This means that the node was previously a legitimate one but due to performing suspicious actions (detected by AD or signature detection (SD) techniques employed by primary defense mechanism, see Section 2), it has lost its legitimacy. Such a node (i.e., now intruder) can still stay in the network until it is formally purged using our scheme. We assume that standard security components (i.e., cryptographic keys for data confidentiality, security measures, etc.) and other basic intrusion detection mechanisms are present within the network. The basic intrusion detection agents could be installed in any node in the network. Hence, our mechanisms start working after an intrusion is detected or some node is suspected of being an intruder. To capture the whole idea in a single sentence, 'We are interested in dealing with the intruder if it is suspected to be such, after it has caused intrusion, rather than purging it out directly from the network'. By 'standard security components' we mean the cryptographic parameters, keys, and other security mechanisms that are used in a device that participates in a given network (please see the basic terms and preliminaries mentioned in Section 2).
Pay-and-Stay model overview
Once a node in the network is suspected as an intruder (by any of the standard components installed in the legitimate devices), our model is employed to force the intruder to work for the network. If it works for the network, we see little problem in allowing the node to stay in the network.
That is because the routing packets and exchanged data within the network would be protected by other cryptographic measures in place, as noted in the previous section. Instead of taking a straight negative decision to defuse it, we give it enough tasks to perform for forwarding any possible network packet to the next hops or to the intended destinations. If the node is an intruder unwilling to participate in the forwarding process of the packets, we decide finally that the node is not suitable for staying in the network and must be purged. Otherwise, by putting it under pressure to forward a huge number of packets, we save the network's other resources. Each forwarding takes energy for wireless transmission; hence, if an intruder does the network's legitimate nodes' job, we drain its energy or make it to pay for its survival/stay in the network. If the node drops the packets randomly or selectively, we catch this with our enforced mechanisms and mark it as a selective forwarder or we charge it for causing selective forwarding (in a selective forwarding attack, the misbehaving node just forwards a subset of the packets that it receives but drops the others 30, 31 ). To employ this policy, the intrusion-tackling agent is installed on each legitimate mesh entity (mesh router or mesh clients, so we use a host-based idea). Figure 3 shows an operational diagram of the Pay-and-Stay intrusion-tackling model. The intrusion database can be stored in any of the devices with a good amount of storage space or could be partially maintained by each node, that is, each legitimate node acts as the intruder tackler for its surrounding nodes. For primary intrusion detection, as noted earlier, any standard scheme could be utilized. Because of the structural dimension of WMNs, it is possible to use such a strategy, whereas for WSNs or other wireless ad hoc networks, such a strategy may not be used. As shown in the figure, our model gets activated after the basic IDS does its part; we deal with what to do after the intrusion, not before the intrusion. The core goal is to maximize or save the utilization of network resources by putting the burden of packet transmissions to a rogue entity. In case the rogue entity denies paying or giving the service, we purge it from the network and, thus, this is an effort of delicately handling an intruder in a WMN setting.
The sections below explain how we achieve this Payand-Stay strategy for intrusion tackling. There are mainly two phases in our approach. The first phase is (i) the game theory-based Pay-and-Stay model, and the second phase is (ii) marking the intruder and taking decision (which is also the part of the intrusion-tackling model). The following sections illustrate our approach in detail.
Game theory-based Pay-and-Stay model
Game theory 32 can be defined as the statistical model to analyze the interaction between a group of players, who act strategically. Figure 4 (all the mathematical notation are explained later) introduces a usual attack model where there are two players involved, namely Player_1, which is the source node S, and Player_2, which is the malicious/ attacker (in our case, the intruder) intermediate node A. Let D be the destination node and N be the finite set of all players. We limit our game to non-cooperative, incomplete information and the zero-sum game model (readers are directed to Javidi and Aliahmadipour, 33 Dutta 34 and MacKenzie and DaSilva 35 ), where one player wins and the other player loses. Our target is that the intruder should spend more than the target to do any wrongdoing with the packet that it needs to forward to the destination. That means the intruder eventually has to pay heavily for its illegal staying within the network. It should be noted that we use the terms intruder and attacker interchangeably throughout the rest of the text. 4.3.1. Mathematical model. Before presenting the mathematical model of our approach, in Table 1 , we note down the basic notation used in this paper for ease of reading and identification of various items at a glance.
We consider a closed scenario involving three nodes. A mesh client can send a packet either directly or via some other node, as shown in Figure 4 . Hence, this model allows packet forwarding in the fringe part with a maximum of two hops. This small portion of the network is taken to present the model and it is applied similarly for any portion of three nodes. Now, let P i be the probability to defend the ith node in the network. We assume that v i is an intermediate node, v iÀ1 is its upstream node and v i + 1 is its downstream node. The total probability of defending all of these N nodes is P N i = 1 P i (here, N = 1, 2, 3). The transmission cost spent by S for the path S to D is E sd = P N i = 1 P i , because the amount of transmission cost that is needed here is the same amount of probability for defending all these nodes (for successful transmission from S to D, please see Figure 4 ). The interaction of different players and their total probabilities are constructed based on their individual probability. The energy probability is defined as the sum of probability of individual nodes (or players) and their energies. The remaining transmission cost in this case is E r = 1 À P N i = 1 P i = 1 À E sd , where E sd ≤ 1. If S transmits via A, then it needs to spend transmission cost E sa = αE sd . That is, E sa is the cost for transmission spent by S for forwarding the packet to A. In this case, α is a constant. The successful attack depends on the value of α. If α > 1, the attack succeeds. If / = 1, the transmission cost spent by the attacker equals that of the target. When α = 0, the attacker cannot attack, and / < 1 means that the attacker cannot drop any packet. Subsequently, E ad is the transmission cost spent by A for forwarding the packet to D (which is desired). Our objective is that the transmission cost that needs to be spent by the attacker (or intruder) in order to compromise the nodes must be more than the transmission cost spent by the target.
As is shown in Figure 4 , the destination D gives some points to source S for the transmitted packet. When the source node S sends the packet through the path S!D, node S receives some points of O d from D (shown with a line with an arrowhead). When S transmits packets via A (i.e., S!A!D), S receives points of O d from D (via the return path that S used to send the packet) but S also gives A some points, O sa . If S does not receive any point from D for the transmitted packet, it means that the packet did not reach to D successfully or A concealed the points to be received. For simplicity, we consider that in this case, the actual transmission failed and D did not receive any packet. Each successful packet transmission from v i node to v i + 1 node causes a transmission cost spending Ev i v i + 1 (as E sa and E ad are defined previously). Now, the utility (denoted by U) of a player (i.e., node) is defined as the actual gain or reward of a player calculated by deducting the transmission cost spent from the total points it receives for successful packet transmission. Therefore, depending on the transmission cost and points received by the source and intruder in the middle (i.e., A), the nodes S and A will remain with the following utilities: In this equation, β is the profit earned by node A. If (O sa À E ad ) < (O sa + β), the utility earned from dropping the packet is higher than the utility received by S for transmitting the packet. Total number of successfully sent-received packets from source to destination P Ack
Probability of acknowledgment P NAck
Probability of no-acknowledgment n t
The number of tampered packets n d
The number of dropped packets n f
The number of total forwarded packets t m
Monitoring threshold t l Loss rate threshold
The state of this game is (m, n), where m is the sending buffer of Player_1 and n is the dropping buffer of Player_2. If one packet is present in the sending buffer of m of Player_1, then m will take a value of 1 and n can take value 0 or d, depending on whether any packet is dropped or not. We also denote μ as the probability that a new packet arrives at the sending buffer of Player_1. There are four possible states of the game:
In a game, the strategy space denoted by A i , is available to each player i. At the time of choosing an action, a player can use either a pure or a mixed strategy. If the actions of the player are deterministic, it is said to use a pure strategy. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over a player's pure strategies. In our case, the strategy set for Player_1 is S 1 = fs 1 , s 2 g, meaning that Player_1 forwards the packet either directly to destination D (represented by s 1 ) or via A (represented by s 2 ). Mixed strategies that correspond to S 1 are π s s 1 , s 2 ð Þ= (p d , p a ), where p d + p a = 1. The strategy set of Player_2 is A 2 = (a 1 , a 2 ). Mixed strategies corresponding to the action of A 2 are π a a 1 , a 2 ð Þ= (q f , q d ), where q f + q d = 1 . Here, q d is the probability of dropping the packet. Hence, the joint set of random stationary strategies is defined by x = (π s , π a ) = (p d , p a , q f , q d ). Table 1 shows the meanings of the basic notation.
Let C x ð Þ = fC k x ð Þ, 8k ∈ K be the steady-state probability 36 where C k x ð Þ denotes the proportion of the time that the process will be in state k. The state transition matrix is denoted by Q(x). The entries of the transition matrix mean the probabilities of transition. Therefore, the transition probabilities from one state to another state are calculated as follows (see the state diagram shown in Figure 5 ).
When (m = 1):
When (m = 0):
where x is the joint strategy as defined before. For example, assume that the current state of the system is (1, 0). Player_1 (i.e., S) has a packet in its send buffer. It uses two strategies: transmit the packet directly or transmit it via A. If S transmits the packet directly to D, then the states are (0, 0) or (1, 0) with probability p d . Otherwise, it transmits the packet via Player_2 (i.e., A) with probability p a . A either drops the packet or forwards it to D. If it drops, then the states become (0, d) or (1, d) . If A forwards the packet, then the next states will be (0, 0) or (1, 0) . It should be noted that A is the potential intruder in this case. Now, one use of probabilities is to calculate expected values (or payoffs) for uncertain outcomes. 37 Suppose that an outcome, for example a money payoff, is uncertain. There are n possible values, X 1 , X 2 ,.,X N . Moreover, we know the probability of obtaining each value. Then, the expected value (or expected payoff) of the uncertain outcome is then given by P X 1 ð ÞX 1 + P X 2 ð ÞX 2 + . . . P X N ð ÞX N So, for S, the expected value associated with state (1, 0) is (using EQUATION (1) and associated probabilities)
Similarly, for state (1, d) , the value is (using Equation (2) and associated probabilities)
The expected utilities of S and A can be calculated from the equations below based on the probability of dropping and forwarding the packets (when the joint strategy is considered):
and, for A, similar calculations can be done: Figure 5 . The state diagram of the transitions among different states.
In both of these equations, C 1, 0 ð Þ = m 1 À m × p a q d ð Þis the long-term (steady-state) probability of being in state (1, 0) and C 1, d ð Þ = m 2 × p a q d is the long-term (steady-state) probability of being in state (1, d) (see Appendix for proof).
4.3.2.
Marking the intruder and taking the decision. In this section, we describe a multi-hop acknowledgement-based algorithm to detect malicious node(s) doing selective forwarding attack. Because of the structure of WMNs, it is possible to utilize this method. We know that the selective forwarding attack is one of the most dangerous attacks because the packets, which may contain sensitive data, are dropped randomly. In this algorithm, multiple nodes need to be selected as acknowledgement points in WMNs. This means that those mesh nodes are responsible for sending an ACK packet after receiving a packet from a source node or the nearest intermediate source nodes. We assume that the WMNs are operating under an ideal channel quality and the majority of the mesh routers are normal-behaving. We are considering that the packet loss occurs only due to malicious activity from an intruder. Moreover, since there may be multiple existing routes from a source mesh node to a destination mesh node, and a source node may receive multiple route replies to each of its route requests, we encourage the source node to keep a record of each route for future reference. It should be noted here that dealing with physical layer or channel-level issues are out of the scope of this work, as we focus on the theoretical framework and mathematical model of the operational concept.
In Figure 6 , we show the structure of a WMN, where S is the source node and D the destination node. We assume v to be the total number of mesh nodes in the forwarding path. λ is the number of malicious nodes among v. Let θ be the set of normal-behaving nodes between each two malicious nodes and 6 be the number of acknowledgement points in the forwarding path. We consider θ as the percentage of randomly selected check points.
When the source node S sends a route request, it receives several route replies. Let us consider that S chooses the route SABCEFG!D, where E is the malicious node. We are considering two selected acknowledgement points (i.e., 6 = 2), namely B and F. B and F will acknowledge back after they receive the packets from the source mesh nodes. Therefore, the following possibilities may occur.
Scenario 1:
One of the nodes is malicious in the forwarding path. Scenario 2: One or more nodes are malicious in the forwarding path. Scenario 3: Both the acknowledgement points B and F are malicious Scenario 4: Either B or F is malicious.
This algorithm uses two approaches -hop-by-hop loss observation and traffic overhearing -to detect a malicious node on the path of data flow. More specifically, we assume v i as an intermediate node, v iÀ1 as the upstream node, and v i + 1 as the downstream node. v i receives a packet from v iÀ1 , then it updates itself with the packet Figure 6 . Multi-hop acknowledgement. count history and with the corresponding packet sequence number and then buffers the link-layer acknowledgment (ACKs) that it receives for each packet and then forwards it to v i + 1 (i.e., the downstream node). We denote w s as the total number of packets that are successfully sent-received by the source S to destination D. n v i → v i + 1 is the number of packets received successfully by v i + 1 (i.e., this is the number of successfully received packets from any intermediate node to its downstream node).
Two operations are performed when the mesh router forwards a packet to the downstream node. When each packet is relayed to the downstream traffic, the mesh router or upstream node buffers the ACKs and overhears the downstream traffic to check whether it (the downstream node) forwarded or tampered with the packet. The upstream node observes these two operations and then makes a simple analysis of the scenario.
The downstream node maintains two parameters. They are (a) the probability of acknowledgment (ACK), which we denote as P Ack , and (b) the probability of noacknowledgment (NACK), P NAck . The probability of ACK (P Ack ) is computed as P Ack = 1 À P NAck and the probability of no-acknowledgment is computed as P NAck = (n t + n d )=n f , where n t is the number of tampered packets, n d is the number of dropped packets, and n f is the number of total forwarded packets.
We introduce two packets -PROBE packet and PROBE_ACK -to detect the malicious routers. The PROBE packet is used by the source node S with every w s data packet to the destination node D. When the source node S sends the PROBE packet through the path, each node in the path marks the PROBE packet with the detection parameters and this is termed packet marking. A PROBE packet sent to destination by the source node is also marked by it (i.e., S) with the number of packets that will be transmitted to a particular destination node. When the PROBE packet is passed along the path, each node v i attaches a mark of its opinion to the downstream node (v i + 1 ). The opinion is calculated by observing the downstream node's behavior by the transmitter node. The opinion of the downstream node is calculated as follows:
where t m is the monitoring threshold and it carries values between 0 and 1. As the PROBE packet is passed through the path, the node also appends the behavior parameter to the PROBE packet. The behavior parameter represents the observation of node v i + 1 about the behavior of its immediate upstream node, v i . The behavior of the node is calculated by determining the packet loss rate over the link (or path) from node v i to node v i + 1 . This is calculated by the following formulae:
is the loss rate of the link that is observed by the node v i + 1 . t l is the loss rate threshold, which can take any value between 0 and 1. The algorithm will detect the malicious behavior with higher probability with the lower values of t l and t m .
The purpose of this mechanism is to confirm whether a node is corrupt or marking it as a clear rogue node and setting it for exclusion from the network. This second part is added with the previously mentioned game model to provide certainty in taking decision of purging intruders. As we are interested in efficient intruder tackling, our approach includes this marking mechanism, but the process should be initiated by an initial IDS that declares a node as a suspected intruder. When packet forwarding tasks are given to the suspected node, the game model and marking procedure investigate the case and find out the reality. All these executions of steps are controlled by the software agent installed in the legitimate mesh nodes.
For clarifying why we termed our approach 'intrusion tackling', let us recall the basic definitions of the IDS, IPS, and IDPS. An IDS is a device or software application that monitors network or system activities for malicious activities or policy violations and produces reports to the administrators. So, the main function of the IDS is detection by sending a report to the administrators; therefore, there is no prevention task in the IDS; the prevention can be done manually by the administrators after receiving the alert from the IDS. Again, an IPS consists of network security appliances that monitor network and/or system activities for malicious activity attempting to block/stop activity, and reporting this activity. So the main function of the IPS is automatic prevention and also sending reports to the administrators about the case. A combination of the IDS and IPS is called the IDPS.
Given these points, our mechanism does not fall under any clear definition of such systems, but rather the mechanism starts working after there is a suspected intruder in the system, and the software agent installed in legitimate nodes deals with the case skillfully. Overall, the mechanism provides the second and final line of defense to ensure proper security against intruders in the network.
Performance evaluation of our model 5.1. Experimental results and discussion
For the game theoretic model analysis, we substititute the values for required cost to transmit packets from S to D, either directly or via A, and the points earned by source S and A as follows: E sd = 0:6, E sa = E ad = 0:05, O d = 1, O sa = 0:3. We assume that the probability that a new packet arrives at the sending buffer of Player_1 is μ = 0:8 (that is, the rate at which packets arrive at the send buffer is quite fast) and β = 0:2 .
Using Equations (5) and (6), we obtained the expected utitilties of Player_1 and Player_2. MATLAB software 38 was used for the evaluation and analysis of our model. Figures 7-11 represent the expected utilities of S and A as a function of drop probability. The packet dropping probabilitiy is chosen between 0 and 1. It is observable from Figures 7-11 that the utility of S is decreasing and utility of A is increasing with the increase of dropping probability. Player_2 reaches the maximum utility when source S transfers all the packets via A with the highest dropping probability. It can be seen from Figure 11 , where p a = 1 and q d = 1, that the maximum utility of U a = 0:4. On the other hand, Player_1 has its maximum utility U s = 0:256 when the probability of sending packets direcly to D (i.e., p d ) increases. The maximum utility of S is shown in Figure 7 , where p d = 0:8 and q d = 0:1. Figure 10 shows the increase of the expected utilities of A and decrease of the utilities of S with respect to different drop probabilities of q d when p d = 0:2 and p a = 0:8. A negative value of U s x ð Þ means that as the probability of dropping increases, while the probability of direct transmission to the destination is low (p d = 0:2) and that of transmission via A is relatively high (p a = 0:8), the packets of S are supposed to be lost in a greater scale, as A would drop packets with a relatively higher rate. So, in such a situation, such kind of communication is unsuitable for S. However, in our mechanism, as there is a software agent involved that tackles the intruder, the agent could persuade S to send packets via A until it is marked as a genuine threat for the network. The significance of the negative values is that they show the unsuitable conditions, where U s x ð Þ decreases significantly but U a x ð Þ increases. Our scheme allows such minor loss, which eventually contributes at a greater scale to provide the desired level of security of the network against intruders. Hence, this trade-off is overall beneficial. All the figures similar to this basically show different conditions and stages based on different values of the associated parameters. The software agent should make intelligent moves for helping the network to purge out unwanted marked intruders, which is our goal for introducing the concept of an agent alongside the other mechanisms.
In addition, in Figure 11 , when the expected utility starts to slide down to a negative value for S and a positive value for A, it means that such packet transmission is discouraged in the usual situation. That is, there is no chance of direct packet transmission to the destination (i.e., p d = 0) but S forwards to A with the goal of transmitting the packet to D (i.e., p a = 1) and the intruder/attacker A subsequently drops packets and gains more profits. Only the intrusion-tackling agent can allow such communication for a short period of time to confirm the harm of the intruder by marking it with our mechanism. Otherwise, in this scenario, there is no suitable communication method from S to D directly or via A (but there may be other paths in the mesh structure considering other nodes nearby, which may not have been compromised or are legitimate ones). Figures 12-16 represent the utilities of S and A as a function of forward probability, p a . The forward probability is chosen between 0 and 1. The utilities of S and A in Figures 12 and 13 are increasing with the increasing forward probability; however, in Figure 13 , the curve for S bends down a little when S forwards more packets to A but there is some drop probability involved. A lower value of p a means a higher value of p d , that is, the option of direct transmission. As p a increases, more packets go through A and A's drop probability (q d ) works on the transmissions; hence, we get the bent curve. The forward probabilities (of A) are q f = 1 and q f = 0:75 and the drop probabilities are q d = 0 and q d = 0:25 in Figures 12 and 13 , respectively. It is clear that in these two figures, the utilities of S and A are increasing; the maximum utility of S is 0.5 and the maximum utility of A is 0.2. In Figures 14-16 , the expected utility of S is decreasing and that of A is increasing, with the maximum utility of A being 0.4; the forward probabilities are q f = 0:5, q f = 0:25, and q f = 0 and the drop probabilities are q d = 0:5, q d = 0:75, and q d = 1.
Marking the intruder in various cases
In the malicious behavior detection phase, the following possible cases may occur when the upstream and downstream nodes are combined to detect malicious activities:
The node v i either drops or tampers with the packets. The probability of NACK is greater than the monitoring threshold, t m . The node v iÀ1 , the upstream node, will observe node v i on whether it drops the packets or tampers with them. Node v iÀ1 will increase n d , which is the number of dropped packets and also n t ,which is the number of tampered packets. The downstream node of v i , node v i + 1 ,will observe if the loss rate is greater than the loss rate threshold t l . The upstream and downstream nodes will observe if node v i is misbehaving.
In this case, the monitoring threshold is greater than the probability of NACK from node v iÀ1 to v i . The node v i is behaving normally. If the observed loss rate of link from v i to v i + 1 is greater than the loss rate threshold, node v i is misbehaving. According to the upstream node, node v i is normal, but on the other hand the downstream node can detect if node v i is misbehaving. To overcome this problem, we need to verify the link-layer acknowledgments that are received by the upstream node v iÀ1 for each packet that is forwarded successfully by the node v i .
In this case, the upstream node v iÀ1 has a greater probability of NACK and is greater than the monitoring threshold, t m . Here, there is a misbehaving activity at the node v i . On the other hand, the observed loss rate link from v i to v i + 1 is lower than t l , which is the loss rate threshold. According to upstream node v iÀ1 , the node v i is misbehaving and the downstream node will consider node v i as normal. To overcome this issue, the upstream node can detect the misbehaving node v i by observing false information in the PROBE packet. 
The downstream and the upstream nodes do not detect any misbehaving node.
Further discussion
The results are shown in Figures 7-16 in terms of drop or forward probabilities. The idea behind this is that the sender node, which is taking the role of Player_1, would always try to minimize its cost of transmission by choosing the low-cost path (that is, p a > p d ). Hence, sending via Player_2 would be an attractive way. When Player_2 is suspected as an intruder, such forwarding tasks are given by the Pay-and-Stay agent in greater scale to put pressure on Player_2, that is, to force it to provide some service. Once the mechanism starts working, Player_1 and Player_2 start competing with each other to maximize the expected utilities. Dropping packets by Player_2 or not forwarding gives higher U a x ð Þ. However, if Player_2 is really behaving maliciously, it would be marked with the intruder marking procedure and thus will be set for purging from the network. All the figures basically indicate what the expected outcomes can be under different conditions and settings.
When the rogue node immediately denies forwarding packets without valid reason, it is marked and purged from the network. It is no different than the method that once an intruder is detected, it is probed and purged from the network. In this case, the same type of overhead would be incurred as in other primary IDS mechanisms (in fact, we have a primary IDS that declares a suspect). The additional benefit we have is the surety of the decision (whether to allow the node to continue or to purge it). Not all the intruders would like to pay and that is why the gain comes when an intruder acts like a selective forwarder and we use it heavily instead of regular nodes to save the resources of the regular legitimate nodes. When an intruder does not know that it is being probed, and does some forwarding tasks, it is the gain for the network that would justify the overhead, if any. Again, if the rogue node is immediately marked to be purged, the approach adds a higher level of certainty alongside the security for the network, for which the overhead should be justifiable. In fact, if in any other scheme, a probe packet is sent to verify the intruder's real condition, that step would also incur some overhead. So, our approach is expected to be suitable and practical. Based on the application scenario, we believe it would be efficient.
To sum up the entire concept, our intrusion-tackling model is meant for protecting the network from a wide range of security attacks that target the routing mechanisms of the network. The basic IDS mechanisms employed on the devices could notify about a suspected intruder and, when our model gets activated to handle the case, we ensure proficiency in dealing with it (that is, to use the apparent negative entity for a positive purpose). Only when it is really proven problematic for the network do we retract its permit to participate in the network in any way. The preliminary IDS mechanism (as noted in Section 4.1) acts as the primary defense against intrusion activity and our mechanism acts as the final line of defense against malicious intrusion. The behavioral analysis to mark the intruder mentioned in Section 5.2 sets the solid defense strategy to make our model effective in practical scenarios. Because of the features of WMNs with the required amount of resources, this model works fine and proves to be effective, while for other wireless networks, such as WSNs, MANETs (mobile ad hoc networks), and VANETs (vehicular ad hoc networks), this model is not directly applicable.
Conclusions and future works
WMNs show promise to be a very handy technology to be utilized in abundance for commercial purposes in future and next-generation networks. Hence, because of the importance of the research topic and lack of satisfactory solutions, we were motivated to come up with our approach of handling intrusions in WMNs. However, it should be mentioned that no such mechanism is foolproof; often supporting mechanisms are needed to reduce the tasks of a single mechanism, and there is an incessant effort by the potential attackers to come up with more innovative methods of attacks and intrusions. Hence, our work is still extensible. For example, as a future work, we would like to investigate in detail how our mechanism performs when there are multiple colluding intruders in the same fringe part of the WMN and they work in collaboration to avoid the detection of the routing anomaly. This could be a challenging and separate research issue. We believe that our mechanism still could be well-resistant against such types of attacks, as the legitimate nodes need to be exploited for the attacker's benefit and the defensive mechanism will be able to deal with that. Still, for largescale WMNs and in various types of applications, this might be an interesting issue to study in detail. Also more investigation and analysis can be performed to check how our model behaves when the channel quality is not ideal. In that case, an extensive simulation study could be performed in the future to find out how the intruder marking part works in different network settings. Other future work could be exploring possibilities of employing this intrusion-tackling mechanism for various next-generation networking technologies. b = d À dμw μw = μ 2 p a q d À μ 2 p a q d × μ × p a q d μ × p a q d = μp a q d (μ À μ 2 p a q d ) μp a q d = m À m 2 p a q d = m(1 À m × p a q d )
